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Abstract
We extend the application of security games from offline patrol scheduling to online
surveillance-driven resource allocation. An important characteristic of this new domain
is that attackers are unable to observe or reliably predict defenders’ strategies. To this end,
in this paper we introduce a new solution concept, called acceptable costs of minimax re-
gret equilibrium, which is independent of attackers’ knowledge of defenders. Instead, we
study how a player’s decision making can be influenced by the emotion of regret and their
attitude towards loss, formalized by the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret.
We then analyse properties of our solution concept and propose a linear programming
formulation. Finally, we prove that our solution concept is robust with respect to small
changes in a player’s degree of loss tolerance by a theoretical evaluation and demonstrate
its viability for online resource allocation through an experimental evaluation.
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1. Introduction
The problem of how to best allocate limited security resources for protecting critical
infrastructure and the general public has attracted much interest in recent years (Tambe,
2011; Kar et al., 2016; Lou et al., 2017). Most of these studies address the problem of
security patrol scheduling. At the same time, the development of intelligent surveillance5
systems has progressed to the extent that threats can be detected in real-time and analytic
information can be used to assess the intentions of an attacker, e.g., using event infer-
ence (Wasserkrug et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2010, 2014; Hong et al., 2016). For this reason,
there is a clear opportunity to understand how other types of security resource allocation
can be informed by real-time intelligent surveillance systems.10
In fact, we can distinguish two sorts of security resource allocation problems within
intelligent surveillance systems. (i) Offline patrol scheduling for security teams, security
checkpoints, and the deployment of surveillance devices, such as CCTV (Closed Circuit
Television) cameras or other sensors-networks. Given that attackers can learn such offline
methods by observations, this sort of security resource allocation problems can be solved15
by methods based on Bayesian Stackelberg games (Tambe, 2011). In this paper, we do
not consider such problems. (ii) Online attacker threat prevention. For this sort of security
resource allocation problems, firstly a defender will take the action after the surveillance
system has detection potential of the attackers and predicted their intention. This means
that it is impossible for the attackers to observe the defender’s actual strategy execution in20
real time and then change their strategy accordingly. Secondly, the environment is highly
dynamic and the defender will execute relevant strategies infrequently, so it is difficult for
the attackers to learn the defender’s behavior from historical data. In this situation, the
attackers havep very limited knowledge about the possible action of the defender. This
is the problem that we will focus in this paper, which we refer to such as a surveillance-25
driven security resource allocation (SDSRA) problem. For example, let us consider the
following scenario:
Example 1. There are three assets in a high street shopping area: a shopping mall, a for-
eign currency exchange shop, and a hotel. An intelligent surveillance system has detected
that a person has been excessively loitering in the area. A combination of event reasoning30
and a comparison of facial image capture with historical data suggests that the person
may be a terrorist or an armed robber or a pickpocket. Suppose there is only one security
team available—which asset should they be assigned to protect?
In the literature, security resource allocation is commonly addressed using a special
type of (non-zero-sum) Bayesian Stackelberg game known as a security game (Pita et al.,35
2009; Tambe, 2011; Ma et al., 2013a). As standard Bayesian Stackelberg games, a secu-
rity game is a two player game where a defender (leader) commits to a strategy, then an
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attacker (follower) chooses their best response with knowledge of the defender’s commit-
ment. And in this kind of security game, uncertainty over the preferences of the attacker
is modelled as a probability distribution over possible attacker types, (i.e., different types40
mean different attack preferences). However, in contrast to the standard Bayesian Stack-
elberg model, security games have the assumption that what is good for the attacker is bad
for the defender and vice versa. By definition, the goal is to mitigate the effects of the at-
tacker, while dealing with uncertainty over their attack preferences, by choosing a strategy
for the defender which will influence the attacker’s choice to the benefit of the defender.45
This is formalized in game theory by a solution concept. Many solution concepts have
been proposed to handle different real-world challenges in security games, including the
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) (Korzhyk et al., 2011), the Strong Stackelberg Equilib-
rium (SSE) (Tambe, 2011), robust non-equilibrium solutions against humans (Pita et al.,
2010) and worst-case approaches for interval uncertainties (Kiekintveld and Kreinovich,50
2012). The vast majority employ the SSE.
A key characteristic of the SSE is that it assumes the attacker has perfect knowledge
of the defender’s strategy, whether by direct observation of the strategy execution or by
learning from historical information. Alternative solution concepts make similarly strong
assumptions, e.g., the BNE assumes the attacker has perfect knowledge of the defender’s55
utility1 values and the defender’s assessment of the attacker type. However, more and more
researchers realise that these assumptions are unrealistic in the context of many real-world
applications, and there has been some work towards their relaxation (Balcan et al., 2015;
Fang et al., 2015; Kar et al., 2015; Sinha et al., 2016). As we will see in more detail in
Section 2, these existing methods are not well suitable to solve SDSRA problems. This60
is because in SDSRA, the attacker is unable to observe the defender’s strategy execution,
while their knowledge of the defender is often too limited to make any meaningful predic-
tions. In fact, when the attacker is faced with incomplete information about the defender,
predictions of the attacker’s strategy in existing models are inconsistent with empirical
observations (Crawford et al., 2013; Goeree and Holt, 2001). Given that the defender’s65
strategy is a best response to their prediction of the attacker’s strategy, which in turn is
based on the attacker’s knowledge of the defender, then this may result in unacceptable
losses for the defender if their prediction of the attacker’s strategy is incorrect. In other
words, in SDSRA, dependence on the attacker’s knowledge of the defender—even if the
imperfection of this knowledge is accepted—may result in serious negative consequences70
for the defender. Clearly, an approach which is independent of the attacker’s knowledge of
the defender is robust to this form of uncertainty. On the other hand, while existing robust
models (e.g., (Kiekintveld and Kreinovich, 2012; Nguyen et al., 2014a; Pita et al., 2010))
1In this paper, the terms utility and payoff are synonymous.
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are based on similar assumptions, they often result in overly conservative behaviour, (i.e.,
they select a strategy for the defender which results in a lower expected utility than neces-75
sary).
To address this issue, in this paper we will propose a new solution concept, called
acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium, to security games in the SDSRA domain
based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret from decision theory. In
particular, our solution concept is based upon the concepts of loss-aversion and regret80
(Ma et al., 2017) in order to predict the behaviour of the attacker, independent of their
knowledge of the defender. Then defender uses this prediction to select a strategy. More
specifically, our solution concept has three assumptions: (A1) each player is loss-averse;
(A2) each player seeks to minimize their maximum regret with respect to their degree of
loss-aversion; and (A3) the defender can be aware of the attacker’s utility values but the85
attacker cannot be aware of the defender’s utility values.
In this paper, our main contributions are as follows. (i) We extend the application of
security games to the surveillance-driven security resource allocation problem. (ii) We
propose a new solution concept, which balances the defender’s desire for rewards from
successful threat prevention with their aversion to losses. (iii) We analyze some properties90
of this new solution concept. (iv) We propose a linear programming formulation. (v) We
prove the robustness of our results. And (vi) we demonstrate its viability for real-world
SDSRA problems with an experimental evaluation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Sec-
tion 3 formally defines the game-theoretic model of an SDSRA problem. Section 3 re-95
caps some basic solution concepts in game theory based on our definition of an SDSRA
problem. Section 5 explains the three assumptions underpinning our new solution con-
cept. Section 6 proposes our new solution concept and analyzes its properties. Section 7
demonstrates our solution concept with a detailed scenario, proves the robustness of our
results, and provides an experimental evaluation. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper100
with possibilities for future work.
2. Related Work
In recent years, there has been an increase in the deployment of intelligent surveillance
systems, largely in response to the high demand for identifying and preventing threats
to public safety, e.g., suspect object tracking (Du et al., 2018) and anti-social behavior105
analysis (Zhang et al., 2016; Ma et al., 2010). The advances in game-theoretic solution-
s to security raise a number of interesting research questions. Although much work has
addressed the issue of uncertainty over attacker types (Kiekintveld et al., 2013; Ma et al.,
2013b; Nguyen et al., 2014b; Yang et al., 2012; Clempner, 2017), to the best of our knowl-
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edge, no work of this kind has studied how to employ these solutions in intelligent surveil-110
lance systems for reactive, online security resource allocation. In the literature, some non-
equilibrium solution concepts have been proposed to handle uncertainty in security games
as well as to address the issue of human adversaries with bounded rationality, bounded
memory and incomplete knowledge of the defender’s strategy. Generally, we can divide
these non-equilibrium solution concepts into two categories:115
Robust solutions: This sort of solution concept focuses on how to guarantee the defend-
er’s expected utility in the worst case, based on an imperfect prediction of the attack-
er’s behavior or on other aspects of uncertainty in security games. Some examples
are robust non-equilibrium solutions against humans (Pita et al., 2010), worst-case
approaches (Kiekintveld and Kreinovich, 2012), the Interval Security Game (ISG)120
model (Kiekintveld et al., 2013), the minimax regret method for interval uncertain-
ty (Nguyen et al., 2014b), the monotonic maximin method for an attacker’s bounded
rationality (Jiang et al., 2013), the MATCH algorithm (Pita et al., 2012), and unified
robust algorithms (Nguyen et al., 2014a).
Utility maximizing solutions: This sort of solution concept focuses on how to maximize125
the defender’s expected utility, based on an appropriate prediction of the attacker’s
behavior obtained by human decision-making models or by learning algorithms.
Some examples are the quantal response equilibrium against human adversaries with
bounded rationality (Yang et al., 2012) and the subjective utility quantal response
method which integrates human decision-making models into game-theoretic algo-130
rithms (Nguyen et al., 2013). At the same time, inspired by developments in machine
learning, some have used learning algorithms to determine the optimal strategy of
the defender by learning how the attacker is likely to respond (Balcan et al., 2015;
Blum et al., 2014; Kar et al., 2015). For example Fang et al. (2015) propose a plan-
ning algorithms and a learning framework to address a problem in the green security135
domain in which adversaries lack the resources to fully observe the defender’s strat-
egy. Also, Sinha et al. (2016) propose the Probably Approximately Correct model
to learn the adversary response function in Stackelberg security games.
In most cases, these non-equilibrium solution concepts are based on the Stackelberg
game framework. Thus, most of them require that the attacker has at least partial knowl-140
edge of the defender’s strategy commitment. For example, the logit quantal response func-
tion adopted in (Yang et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2015;
Sinha et al., 2016) is a function P : Rn → Y from the vector of expected utilities for an at-
tacker’s strategy to a probability distribution over the strategy. The function is defined as:
Pj(
−→u ) = eλuj∑
j′ e
λuj′ , where Pj(
−→u ) is the probability of an attacker playing strategy j given145
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the expected utility vector −→u ∈ Rn and an error parameter λ ≥ 0. Importantly, regardless
of whether vector −→u is obtained by an expected utility function or by a subjective utility
function, knowledge of the defender’s coverage probability for each target is required to
construct the expected utility vector. In other words, it requires at least partial knowledge
of the defender’s strategy selection. There are two exceptions which can model the situa-150
tion in which the attacker has no knowledge of the defender’s strategy: in some worst case
approaches (Pita et al., 2010; Kiekintveld and Kreinovich, 2012; Nguyen et al., 2014a) and
in some quantal response approaches (Yang et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2013; Jiang et al.,
2013; Blum et al., 2014; Balcan et al., 2015; Kar et al., 2015). However, there are impor-
tant limitations with each. For the worst case solutions, in a sense, the defender disregards155
any knowledge that they may have about the attacker’s utilities, so it is arguable that these
approaches are overly conservative (Jiang et al., 2013). That is, they select a strategy for
the defender which results in a lower expected utility than is necessary. For the quantal
response solutions, the attacker’s ignorance over the defender’s strategy is modelled by a
mixed strategy which assigns equal probabilities to all pure strategies, (i.e., by applying160
the principle of indifference). This raises two questions. Firstly, is it acceptable to apply
the principle of indifference to describe the attacker’s complete ignorance? Secondly, is
it reasonable to assume that the attacker still pursues a higher expected utility when they
have no idea about the defender’s strategy? In the literature, many psychological experi-
ments and analysis of economics have provided strong evidence to support that applying165
the principle of indifference in this way can produce results that do not correspond to actu-
al human decision making (Savage, 1951; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Kahneman, 2003).
In the case of utility maximizing solutions, these methods often explore a new di-
rection in security games where machine learning is used to learn and predict adversary170
behavior using available data about player interactions. However, these data-driven meth-
ods all require significant amounts of historical data about player interactions in order to
learn a reasonably representative model of adversary behavior. Clearly, as argued by Fang
et al. (2015), Sinha et al. (2016), and Tambe (2011), there is very limited data available
in infrastructure security domains (which we focus on in SDSRA problems) in compar-175
ison to green security domains. Thus, it is unrealistic to assume that we can learn an
adequate model of player interactions from historical data. As mentioned previously, in
SDSRA problems, the assumption of complete or partial knowledge of the defender’s s-
trategy commitment is unrealistic for two reasons. Firstly, the defender selects a strategy
in response to the detection of an attacker, which means that it is impossible for the attack-180
er to observe the defender’s actual strategy execution in real-time and then update change
their own strategy accordingly. Secondly, the environment is highly dynamic and the de-
fender will execute relevant strategies infrequently, so it is difficult for the attacker to learn
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the defender’s likely behavior from historical data. Due to these reasons plus the limita-
tions of the worst cases approaches and the principle of indifference, none of the existing185
concepts of solution to security games are directly applicable to SDSRA problems.
3. Security Games for SDSRA
Generally speaking, an SDSRA problem involves an intelligent surveillance system
(e.g., based on CCTV or sensor-networks), which continuously detects potential threats
by considering the characteristics and behavior of potential attackers. In real-world SD-190
SRA problems, an attacker may select multiple targets to attack but a defender only has
limited resources for protecting these targets. As a result, in order to best allocate the
security resources, the defender must online determine which target the attacker is most
likely to attack. This contrasts with offline patrol scheduling problems in traditional secu-
rity games, where the defender attempts to assign all security resources so as to prevent195
possible attacks. In an SDSRA problem, the defender may instead prefer to retain some
security resources so as to protect against the possibility of more significant attacks in the
future. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the defender will not allocate more security
resources than the number of attackers. Of course, it is also possible for a single security
resource to defend against more than one attacker in real-world applications. This would200
suggest that there are more attackers than the number of security resources.
However, by our acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium, the attackers’ strate-
gies are determined by the amounts of security resources and the defender’s optimal s-
trategy is determined by the prediction of the attackers’ strategies. (More details can read
Sections 5 and 6). As a result, after the amounts of security resources is given, the number205
of attacker will only influence the structure of the utility function (more details about the
construction of the utility function will be shown in Definition 1 and the two paragraphs
after it). Thus, since the attackers’ strategies are determined by the amounts of security
resources, if we can understand the attackers’ strategy in the case where the amount of
security resources is the same as the numbers of attackers, then it is easy to extend our210
method to predict the attackers’ strategy when the amounts of security resources is less
than the number of attackers. Hence, after we obtain the attackers’ strategies, we can ob-
tain the defender’s optimal strategy based on such attackers’ prediction strategy easily. In
addition, in case of multiple attackers, we assume that the attackers act independently (e.g.,
they cannot negotiate, cooperate, or share the profit obtained from the game), which is the215
same assumption made by traditional security games (Pita et al., 2009; Tambe, 2011). For
these reasons, and in order to focus on the essence of SDSRA problem, we impose the
following assumption about SDSRA problems:
In a given situation, the defender will allocate the same number of security
7
Target Covered UncoveredD A D A
SM 7 -7 -8 9
FCE 4 -2 -3 3
H 6 -6 -6 5
(a) t1 = 0.2.
Target Covered UncoveredD A D A
SM 5 -5 -4 5
FCE 7 -8 -6 7
H 6 -5 -5 5
(b) t2 = 0.3.
Target Covered UncoveredD A D A
SM 5 -8 -5 7
FCE 5 -7 -4 6
H 7 -7 -6 6
(c) t3 = 0.5.
Table 1: Security game where σ1 = 0.5, D stands for Defender and A stands for Attacker.
resources as number of attackers, while the attackers operate independently.220
Thus, we can formally define a security game for SDSRA as follows:
Definition 1. A security game for a Surveillance-Driven Security Resource Allocation
(SDSRA) problem is an 8-tuple (N, l, T , p, K,A,Ψ, U) where:
(i) N = {1, 2} is the set of players, where player 1 represents the defender and player
2 represents the attacker;225
(ii) l is the number of attacker that the defender has to face in a scenario;
(iii) T = {t1, . . . , tn} is a non-empty finite set of n possible attacker types;
(iv) p is a probability distribution over T ;
(v) K = {k1, . . . , km} is a set of targets;
(vi) A = {A1, A2} where A1 denotes the set of pure strategies (action-plans) for the230
defender (i.e., player 1) and A2 denotes the set of pure strategies for the attacker
(i.e., player 2) such that there exists a bijection f : Ai → K l where l is the number
of attackers;
(vii) Ψ = A1 × A2 is the set of pure strategy profiles; and
(viii) U = {uti | i ∈ N, t ∈ T} where uti : Ψ → R is a utility function for player i with235
respect to attacker type t.
In fact, in an SDSRA security game, in order to assign the utility values to each target
for both players, the defender needs to consider the importance of each target for the given
player and the effect of intelligent surveillance systems on the attackers (i.e, the patrol
scheduling of security team, the checkpoint setting, and the CCTV or sensor-networks240
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SM FCE H
SM 7, -7 -3, 3 -6, 5
FCE -8, 9 4, -2 -6, 5
H -8, 9 -3, 3 6, -6
(a) t1 = 0.2.
SM FCE H
SM 5, -5 -6, 7 -5, 5
FCE -4, 5 7, -8 -5, 5
H -4, 5 -6, 7 6, -5
(b) t2 = 0.3.
SM FCE H
SM 5, -8 -4, 6 -6, 6
FCE -5, 7 5, -7 -6, 6
H -5, 7 -4, 6 7, -7
(c) t3 = 0.5p.
Table 2: Complete utility matrices for security game where σ1 = 0.5.
deployment around each target). For example, although the importance of a control center
in an airport is very high, after considering a checkpoint before the entrance of the control
center and the sensor-network setting in it, the security team should think the chance of an
attacker choose the control center to attack is low. Thus, the defender should reduce the
utility value of the control center. In this paper, we assume the utility values are a set of245
point values that are given by the security team.
Moreover, given that covering or attacking a target with one resource is essentially the
same as covering or attacking it with any positive number of resources, the set of pure
strategies Ai of a player i ∈ N can also be represented by a set D ⊆ {0, 1}|K|, where each
element di ∈ D is a coverage vector di = (d1i , . . . , d|K|i ) with
∑|K|
j=1 d
j
i = l such that l is the250
number of attackers in the game. Thus, each dji says whether target kj ∈ K is covered or
attacked. Hence, a mixed (randomized) strategy ∆i for player i is a probability distribution
over the set of pure strategies Ai. For this reason, a mixed strategy ∆i is equivalent to a
pure strategy ai ∈ Ai when ∆i(ai) = 1 and vice versa. When this is the case, we will
simply write ai rather than ∆i. Also, we may abuse notation and apply a utility function255
to a mixed strategy profile, (i.e., where one or both players commit to a mixed strategy).
Given a mixed strategy profile (∆1,∆2) and an attacker type t, the utility of player i is
defined as follows:
uti(∆1,∆2) =
∑
a1∈A1
∑
a2∈A2
∆1(a1)∆2(a2)u
t
i(a1, a2). (1)
These types of probability-weighted utilities are referred to as expected utilities. Impor-260
tantly, the “probabilistic surveillance information” that we have referred to is modelled by
the probability distribution p over the set of attacker types T .
In Definition 1, we define an SDSRA security game with a utility structure corre-
sponding to the real-world problem of infrastructure security as in Stackelberg security
games (Tambe, 2011). As in Stackelberg security games, a simplification in SDSRA secu-265
rity games is to only assign utility values based on whether an asset is covered or uncovered
(refer to Table 1 for an example). In the former, the attacker is unsuccessful (i.e., the de-
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fender wins) if they target an asset which is protected by the defender, while in the latter,
the attacker is successful (i.e., the attacker wins) if they target an asset but the defender is
protecting another. For this reason, we often refer to these assets as targets for the attacker270
and represent them as the set K in Definition 1. In addition, we assume that each player
will have positive utility values for pure strategy profiles in which they win, and negative
utility values for pure strategy profiles in which they lose. This is a common restriction
in the literature which differentiates security games from standard Bayesian Stackelberg
games. Moreover, it means that an SDSRA security game satisfies the property that there275
exists no dominant strategy for either player. Specifically, a dominant strategy is a strategy
where the utility for the player is always higher than for another strategy, regardless of
how the player’s opponent might play. Finally, given a mixed strategy ∆1 for the defender
(which specifies the probability of playing each pure strategy), the probability of cover-
ing a target kj is
∑
d1∈D d
j
1∆1(aj). For example, suppose the defender has two coverage280
vectors: d1 = (0, 1, 1) and d′1 = (1, 0, 1). For the mixed strategy ∆1 = (0.3, 0.7), the
corresponding vector of coverage probabilities is 0.3 · d1 + 0.7 · d2 = (0.7, 0.3, 1).
Now, we consider the scenario from Example 1 to explain the concepts in Definition 1
as follows:
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). Suppose in an airport, there are three security targets:285
a shopping mall (SM), a foreign currency exchange shop (FCE), and a hotel (H). There
are three possible types of attacker: a terrorist (t1), an armed robber (t2), and a pickpocket
(t3). The scenario can be modelled as an SDSRA security game by Definition 1 as follows:
(i) It is a security game for SDSRA with two players where player 1 is the defender and
player 2 is the attacker. Thus, we have a player set N = {1, 2};.290
(ii) The number of attacker is l = 1, since the scenario only has one attacker.
(iii) The possible attacker types set is T = {t1, t2, t3}, where t1 means he is a terrorist, t2
means he is an armed robber, and t3 means he is a pickpocket.
(iv) When the threat is detected, an assessment is made of the possible type of attacker in
the form of a probability distribution over the set of the types: p(t1) = 0.2, p(t2) =295
0.3, and p(t3) = 0.5.
(v) The targets set is K = {SM,FCE,H}.
(vi) The pure strategies of each player is described in Table 2: the defender can choose
one of these three targets to cover, and the attacker can choose one of these three
target to attack. Moreover, we have the pure strategy set for each player that A1 =300
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X Y
A 1, 0 0, 1
B 0, 3 1, 0
Table 3: Aumann and Maschler Game.
A2 = {SM,FCE,H}. Here, an element x ∈ A1 means targets x is covered by the
defender; and an element y ∈ A2 means target y is attacked by the attacker. Also, any
pure strategy can describe by a coverage vector. For example, the defender covers
SM can be described as d1 = (1, 0, 0). And this method is helpful when the number
of resource or attacker is more than 1. For example, a pure strategy describes that305
the attacker will attack SM and H can be represented as d2 = (1, 0, 1).
(vii) The set of pure strategy profiles Ψ =A1 × A2. For example, a pure strategy profile
(FCE, SM) means that the defender chooses FCE to cover and the attacker chooses
SM to attack.
(viii) The utility matrix for each player with respect to each attacker type as shown in310
Tables 1 and 2. For example, ut21 (SM,FCE) = −6 and ut32 (SM,FCE) = −6.
4. Main Solution Concepts in Simultaneous Move Games
In this section we will recap some existing solution concepts from static (simultaneous
move) game with reference to our definition of an SDSRA security game. These solutions
concepts include the Nash Equilibrium, the mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE), the315
maximin strategy, and the minimax regret strategy.
Nash Equilibrium: A Nash Equilibrium of a two player non-cooperative static (simul-
taneous move) game is a mixed strategy profile (∆∗1,∆
∗
2) such that each player is playing
a best response to the strategy selected by their opponent. Formally, a Nash Equilibrium
is a mixed strategy profile (∆∗1,∆
∗
2) which satisfies that, for each player i ∈ N and for any320
mixed strategy ∆i:
u1(∆
∗
1,∆
∗
2) ≥ u1(∆1,∆∗2), (2)
u2(∆
∗
1,∆
∗
2) ≥ u2(∆∗1,∆2). (3)
Example 3. Consider the security game from Table 3. Suppose the column player is
a defender and the row player is an attacker where the attacker selects an equilibrium
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strategy mixed strategy {∆2(X) = q,∆2(Y ) = 1 − q} such that 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. In this case,
the defender’s expected utility will be:
u1(∆1,∆2) = (p · q · 1) + (p · (1− q) · 0) + ((1− p) · q · 0) + ((1− p) · (1− q) · 1)
for any mixed strategy {∆1(A) = p,∆1(B) = 1− p} such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Thus, by formulas (2) and (3), the defender’s best response to the strategy selected325
by the attacker is: if q < 1
2
, then p = 0; if q > 1
2
, then p = 1; and if q = 1
2
, then
p ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, the attacker’s best response to the strategy selected by the defender
is: if p < 3
4
, then q = 1; if p > 3
4
, then q = 0; and if p = 3
4
, then q ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
the unique Nash Equilibrium (∆1,∆2) of this game that satisfies formulas (2) and (3) is
{∆1(A) = 34 ,∆1(B) = 14} and {∆2(X) = 12 ,∆2(Y ) = 12}.330
Mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE): The mixed BNE is a solution concept for
a non-cooperative static game with incomplete information about the characteristics (i.e.,
utility values) of other players. In this solution concept, each player is assumed to know
the equilibrium mixed strategies of other players as well as the possible player types of
other players. In addition, none of the players can obtain a higher expected utility by335
only changing their own mixed strategy. More formally, in an SDSRA security game
(N, T , p, K,A,Ψ, U), the mixed BNE with respect to each attacker type t is a mixed
strategy profile (∆∗1,∆
t,∗
2 ) which satisfies that, for any mixed strategy ∆1 of the defender,
we have that: ∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) ≥
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆1,∆
t,∗
2 ). (4)340
Also, for any mixed strategy ∆t2 of the attacker of type t, we have that:
ut2(∆
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) ≥ ut2(∆∗1,∆t2). (5)
Clearly, by formulas (4) and (5), the computation of a mixed BNE is similar to the
Nash Equilibrium in Example 3. In additional, in order to satisfy the assumption that each
player knows the equilibrium mixed strategies of other players, it is assumed that the utility345
matrices are common knowledge2 to all players. Particularly, if there exists a mixed BNE
for a given static game in which each player needs to assign a positive probability for each
pure strategy, then we call this mixed BNE a completely mixed BNE.
Maximin strategy: The concept of loss-aversion is based on the observation that deci-
sion makers will strongly prefer to avoid unacceptable losses when faced with uncertainty,350
2There is common knowledge of φ in a group of agents when all agents know φ, when all agents know
that all agents know φ, and so on ad infinitum. (Fagin et al., 2004)
12
rather than to attempt to acquire higher gains. In decision theory, this concept is usually
formalized by the maximin decision rule (i.e., Γ-maximin) (Osborne, 2003). In game the-
ory, the maximin strategy is a solution strategy based on this concept, in which a player
seeks to minimize potential losses by considering the worst case (maximum loss) scenari-
o. More formally, with the defender (i.e., player 1) and the attacker (i.e., player 2) in an355
SDSRA security game, the maxmin strategy ∆i for player i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is defined as
follows:
∆1 = argmax
∆1
(
min
∆2
u1(∆1,∆2)
)
, (6)
∆2 = argmax
∆2
(
min
∆1
u1(∆1,∆2)
)
. (7)
Example 4. Consider the security game from Table 3. Suppose the defender’s maximin360
strategy is {∆1(A) = p,∆1(B) = 1 − p} with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Since there does not exist any
dominant strategy in this game, by formulas (6) and (7), there exists a constant C such
that for any mixed strategy {∆2(X) = q,∆2(Y ) = 1− q} with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, we have
u1(∆1,∆2) = (p · q · 1) + (p · (1− q) · 0) + ((1− p) · q · 0) + ((1− p) · (1− q) · 1)
= C.365
Thus, for the defender, we have {∆1(A) = 12 ,∆1(B) = 12}. Similarly, for the attacker, by
the same method, we have {∆2(X) = 14 ,∆2(Y ) = 34}.
Minimax regret strategy: Regret is an emotion associated with decisions which yield
less desirable outcomes. In decision theory, this concept is usually formalized by the prin-
ciple of minimax regret (Savage, 1951). As with loss tolerance, this concept can be applied370
into game theory. That is, when a player selects a strategy, they may feel regret when con-
sidering the possibility of obtaining higher utilities by selecting alternative strategies. In
order to limit regret, the player should select a strategy that minimizes their maximum
regret with respect to all other strategies. More formally, with the defender (i.e., player 1)
and the attacker (i.e., player 2) in an SDSRA security game, the minimax regret strategy375
γ(∆i) for player i ∈ N is defined as follows:
γ(∆1) = argmin
∆1
(
max
∆2
(
max
∆′1
u1(∆
′
1,∆2)− u1(∆1,∆2)
))
, (8)
γ(∆2) = argmin
∆2
(
max
∆1
(
max
∆′2
u2(∆1,∆
′
2)− u2(∆1,∆2)
))
. (9)
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Example 5. Consider the security game from Table 3. Suppose the attacker’s minimax
regret strategy is {γ(∆2)(X) = q, γ(∆2)(Y ) = 1 − q} with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Since there does380
not exist any dominant strategy in this game, by formulas (8) and (9), for any pure strategy
(i.e., A and B) of the defender, we have
u2(A, Y )− u2(A, γ(∆2)) = 1− 1× (1− q)
= u2(B,X)− u2(B, γ(∆2))
= 3− 3× q.385
Thus, for the attacker, we have {∆2(X) = 34 ,∆2(Y ) = 14}. Similarly, for the defender, by
the same method, we have {∆1(A) = 12 ,∆1(B) = 12}.
In this section, we have provided some simple examples for the computation of all
related solution concepts, including the Nash Equilibrium, the Mixed BNE, the Maximin
strategy, and the Minimax regret strategy. For more details, as well as some approximate390
algorithms, we refer the reader to (Osborne, 2003).
5. Rationalizability in SDSRA
In this section, we will provide an epistemic characterization of the intuition behind our
solution concept (i.e., acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium), comparable to the
idea of rationalizability in the Nash Equilibrium (Osborne, 2003). Recall the assumptions395
from Section 1 on which our solution concept is based:
(A1) Each player considers the influence of loss-aversion (i.e., the tendency to prefer en-
suring a sufficient minimum expected utility, rather than seeking some potential
maximum expected utility).
(A2) Each player minimizes their maximum regret while considering their attitude to-400
wards loss-aversion and the strategic choices of others.
(A3) The attacker’s utility matrix is known by the defender and each player knows their
own utility matrix.
Clearly, these assumptions differ from Nash Equilibrium or mixed BNE, which gen-
erally assume that each player always seeks to maximize their expected utility based on405
common knowledge (e.g., the utilities and expected behavior of other players). The reason
why we remove the traditional assumptions are: (i) common knowledge about the belief-
s of others can lead to an infinite hierarchy of beliefs which may in turn be intractable
for real-world applications, particularly in the case of online SDSRA systems; (ii) it is
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not always realistic to assume that an attacker has the correct subjective beliefs about a410
defender’s strategy, because they cannot know the defender’s thought about the attacker
type; and (iii) the defender’s prediction of the attacker’s strategy may be imperfect but,
since some losses are unacceptable, they want to ensure that, at least, their losses will not
exceed an acceptable minimal payoff. In term of “acceptable” means that, depending on
the player’s attitude towards loss-aversion, the player only selects a strategy with a loss415
(i.e., a negative payoff) that is higher than some given constant. Therefore, this constant
can be viewed as the minimal acceptable payoff, i.e., the constant acts as a threshold to
determine whether or not a strategy is acceptable to the player.
Consider assumption A1: Each player considers the influence of loss-aversion. The
meaning of this assumption is that, if a player cannot determine a strategy with maximum420
expected utility with respect to the other player’s strategy, then they should strongly prefer
to avoid unacceptable losses rather than attempt to acquire higher gains. The influence
of loss-aversion on decision making has been convincingly demonstrated in psychological
and economic experiments (Kahneman, 2003). Also, the loss-aversion coefficients may
vary for different categories of decision maker (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). Some deci-425
sion makers are willing to suffer a higher loss for the chance of acquiring higher rewards,
whilst some decision makers strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. In SD-
SRA problems, both players suffer from the same problem. If a player chooses a strategy
that causes the maximin expected utility, then they can ensure that their expected utility
is no less than this value. Therefore, the selection of another strategy always means that430
their expected utility is less than the maximin expected utility. That is, players suffer a
loss of their minimum expected utility if they select a different strategy. This idea of con-
sidering a player’s attitude towards loss-aversion has been discussed in the literature. An
example in (Pruzhansky, 2011) called Aumann and Maschler Game is, perhaps, the most
well-known. Consider the Aumann and Maschler Game in Table 3. By Example 3, we435
can find that the unique Nash Equilibrium of this game is {∆row(A) = 34 ,∆row(B) = 14}
and {∆col(X) = 12 ,∆col(Y ) = 12}. As such, by formula (1), the expected utilities are 12
for the row player and 3
4
for the column player. Moreover, by Example 4, we can find that
the maximin strategy for the row player is {∆row(A) = 12 ,∆row(B) = 12} and the maximin
strategy for the column player is {∆col(X) = 14 ,∆col(Y ) = 34}. In this case, by formula440
(1), the worst case expected utility for the row player is 1
2
and for the column player is 3
4
.
As a result, the expected utilities for each player with respect to the Nash Equilibrium can
be guaranteed by the maximin strategy for each player.
In the work of Harsanyi (1977) and Pruzhansky (2011), there are many arguments
about what strategy should be selected by each player: Nash Equilibrium or maximin445
strategies? Some researchers, such as Harsanyi (Harsanyi, 1977), have argued that the
players should choose their maximin strategies, since the Nash Equilibrium means a player
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X Y
A 40, 320 80, 40
B 80, 40 40, 80
Table 4: Asymmetric matching pennies.
risks losing their maximin value without gaining a higher expected utility. Without losing
the general idea of loss-aversion, in our games, we can interpret the meaning of loss-
aversion more specifically as follows:450
A player selects a strategy with a higher gain, as long as the minimum expect-
ed utility for this strategy is an acceptable reduction of their maximin expected
utility.
In line with the notion of an acceptable strategy, the term of acceptable reduction refers
a requirement that the difference between the minimum expected utility and the maximin455
expected utility is less than the difference between the acceptable minimal payoff and the
maximin expected utility.
While the maximin strategy can guarantee the attacker’s minimum expected utility, it
is possible that it cannot be represent a correct prediction of the behavior of the attacker
in an SDSRA security game, (e.g., the attacker may choose to risk an attempt to obtain a460
higher expected utility). An experimental evaluation of the game in Table 4 was carried
out in (Goeree et al., 2001). In this game, by formulas (4) and (5), following the same
method in Example 3, we can obtain that the unique Nash Equilibrium is (∆row,∆col) such
that {∆row(A) = 18 ,∆row(B) = 78} and {∆col(X) = 12 ,∆col(Y ) = 12}. On the other hand,
by formulas (6) and (7), following the same method in Example 4, the maximin strategy465
for the column player is the mixed strategy {∆col(X) = 18 ,∆col(Y ) = 78}. By formula
(1), we can easily find that the maximin strategy for the column player can guarantee
that their expected utility is not less than the expected utility for the completely mixed
Nash Equilibrium. Thus, if the column player must select a pure strategy to play, then
he should select X and Y in an even number of cases with the Nash Equilibrium, but Y470
in most cases with the maximin strategy. However, the experimental results in (Goeree
et al., 2001) show quite different results for the column player if most people (96%) were
to choose a pure strategy X . This is our reason for considering other factors that may
influence the attacker’s decision in an SDSRA security game.
Consider assumption A2: Each player minimizes their maximum regret while consid-475
ering their attitude towards loss-aversion and the strategic choices of others. The meaning
of this assumption is that, in our games, players minimize their maximum regret based on
an acceptable minimal payoff, rather than maximize their expected utility based on their
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X Y
A 40, 350 80, 80
B 80, -190 40, 80
Table 5: Regret game.
subjective beliefs about another player’s strategy. Actually, since the minimax regret s-
trategy does not require a player to have knowledge of the other players’ strategies, to480
some extent, it is more realistic to select this strategy than the Nash Equilibrium strategy
in an online surveillance environment. In fact, many behavioral studies (e.g., (Chua et al.,
2009)) show that human decisions under uncertainty are strongly influenced by the emo-
tion of regret. The minimax regret principle suggested in (Savage, 1951) says that a choice
is admissible if this choice minimizes the maximum difference between the outcome of a485
choice and the best outcome that could potentially have been obtained. For the game in
Table 4, by formulas (8) and (9), following the same method in Example 5, we find that
the minimax regret strategy for the column player is {∆col(X) = 78 ,∆col(Y ) = 18}. This
result supports the findings from (Goeree et al., 2001), which says that most people will
select the pure strategy X . On the other hand, in the field of game theory, researcher-490
s increasingly consider the effect of regret in strategy selections. For example, Halpern
and Pass (2012) applied the minimax regret principle to explain many paradoxes in game
theory that are caused by applying the Nash Equilibrium concept, such as the well-known
Traveler’s Dilemma and the Centipede Game. However, in an SDSRA problem, different
defenders might have different degrees of loss-aversion. Since an attacker cannot fully495
observe a defender’s whole strategy selection process, it is unrealistic to assume that they
have perfect knowledge of a defender’s attitude towards loss-aversion.3 For this reason,
the Iterated Regret Minimization method in (Halpern and Pass, 2012) cannot be applied
into our surveillance environment.
Although there are many advantages of the minimax regret strategy (e.g., in producing500
satisfactory results for many experimental behavioral studies), it still has some limitations
in addressing the problem of online SDSRA. Let us discuss the game in Table 5. By for-
mulas (8) and (9), following the same method in Example 5, we can find that the minimax
regret strategy for the column player is {∆col(X) = 12 ,∆col(Y ) = 12}. However, selecting
this mixed strategy means that the column player may suffer a negative expected utility505
−55 if the row player selects the strategy B. Conversely, the column player can guarantee
3Conversely, an attacker’s degree of loss-aversion can be obtained from historical data, criminology
experts, etc.
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the positive expected utility of 80 by selecting pure strategy Y . In the security domain,
clearly it is more reasonable that a strategy which reduces the potential loss is preferred
to a strategy which may result in higher gain, e.g., if the loss is unacceptable, such as hu-
man life. As such, it is also necessary to consider a player’s degree of loss-aversion. In510
this vein, we rely on the maximin strategy for determining an acceptable minimal payof-
f, and suggest that players should seek to minimize their maximum regret based on this
acceptable minimal payoff.
Finally, consider assumption A3: The attacker’s utility matrix is known by the defend-
er and each player knows their own utility matrix. This is already accepted by solution515
concepts in the Stackelberg game framework (Tambe, 2011) because, when being applied
to real-world security applications, this assumption is more realistic than that of the Nash
Equilibrium. There are two obvious reasons. The first reason is that A3 allows the attacker
to have partial information about the defender’s utility matrix, whereas in the Nash Equi-
librium this information must be prefect. In real-world application, although an attacker520
may be aware of the defender’s utility values associated with attacks on some targets, it is
not very realistic to assume that an attacker has perfect information about all targets. For
example, some utility values may correspond to subjective estimations by a domain expert,
and others has may correspond to dynamic features of the environment. For instance, the
utility value of a unique location, (e.g., the Butterfly Garden in Singapore Changi Airport)525
might be subjectively estimated by the domain expert, while the utility value of a shopping
mall might be determined by the number of people inside (which will fluctuate dynami-
cally). On the other hand, utility values may be updated at any time due to external events
that the attacker may not realise. The second reason is that A3 does not require that strate-
gies and utility values are common knowledge among players, whereas this is required by530
the Nash Equilibrium. As mentioned previously, it is unlikely that players in an online
SDSRA environment can be sure about the information obtained by their opponent, thus
common knowledge about the beliefs of others is impossible.
These assumptions reveal two factors which must be considered during a player’s strat-
egy selection: (i) guaranteed safety level—a given player compares the minimum expected535
utility of their selected strategy with the maximin expected utility in the game, especially
in situations where this player does not have common knowledge of the opponent’s strat-
egy or where the expected utility for each strategy is imprecise; and (ii) maximum regret
minimization—a given player attempts to minimize the anticipated emotion of regret un-
der uncertainty by a (hypothetical) comparison between the minimum expected utility of a540
strategy and the maximum expected utility that alternatives may provide. Thus, according
to assumptions A1, A2, and A3, our solution concept should follow the principle below:
A player will select a strategy with a lower maximum regret, after considering
whether or not its minimum expected utility is an acceptable reduction of their
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maximin expected utility.545
By considering the acceptable reduction of their maximin expected utility as an ac-
ceptable cost, we call it the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret. This principle
has two advantages. Firstly, it avoids the overly pessimistic result of the maximin strategy,
which focuses on the worst case outcome. For example, suppose a lottery game sells $1
per-ticket with a 99% chance of winning $5,000, then the maximin strategy would reject550
the offer, since the potential loss of $1 could lead to the minimum value lower than re-
jecting the offer. However, following our principle, the regret for not buying the ticket is
$4,999 and the regret for buying the ticket is $1 while the maximin expected utility is not
strictly required. As such, if losing $1 is acceptable to a player, then they will take the risk.
Secondly, it avoids the potential for unacceptable losses with the minimax regret strategy.555
For example, suppose a lottery sells $100 per-ticket with a 1% chance of winning $5,000,
then the minimax regret strategy would always accept the offer. However, in our principle,
since a player needs to consider whether losing $100 is an acceptable cost, they may not
accept the offer. These advantages are useful in real-world applications since, in security
domains, some losses are unacceptable (e.g., human life) while a defender may lose the560
chance to act by selecting an overly pessimistic strategy. Based on this principle, we call
our solution concept the acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium, which will be
detailed in the next section.
6. Acceptable Costs of Minimax Regret Equilibrium
In order to determine each player’s strategy according to the principle of acceptable565
costs of minimax regret, we must first determine an acceptable minimal payoff. Clear-
ly, the maximum value of a player’s acceptable minimal payoff is their maximin expect-
ed utility (i.e., max min(X)), while the minimum value is their minimin expected util-
ity (i.e., min min(X)). Thus, their acceptable minimal payoffs must be in the interval
[min min(X),max min(X)]. In order to support different degrees of loss-aversion for570
different types of players, we rely on a similar approach to that used by the Hurwicz crite-
rion (Jaffray and Jeleva, 2007) by transforming this interval into a point value using a loss
tolerance degree σ ∈ [0, 1]. With this degree, we can determine the acceptable minimal
payoff for each player by σ min min(X) + (1− σ) max min(X).
In other words, the player needs to consider the lower and upper boundaries of their575
minimum expected utility and, according to their loss tolerance degree, will place more or
less importance on each. Clearly, a higher σ value will result in a lower acceptable minimal
payoff and a more risk-seeking player. In particular, if σ = 1, then a player does not care
about potential loss (i.e., the player is completely optimistic). Conversely, if σ = 0, then
a player cares only about potential loss (i.e., the player will be completely pessimistic). In580
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real-world applications, the issue of estimating loss tolerance degrees is arguably no more
or less realistic than estimating utility values or the probability distribution over attacker
types. Essentially, we are assuming that this information can be learned from data or can
be estimated by domain experts. In fact, even if it is impossible to estimate these values,
our method is still capable of modelling the concept of loss tolerance in a general way,585
through a fixed loss tolerance degree for all players. For example, if we want to state that
all players are neutral about the loss then we might assign a loss tolerance degree of 0.5 to
all players.
Once we have identified the strategies which are acceptable according to a player’s
loss tolerance degree, the remaining issue is to ensure that the player selects, from those590
strategies, the strategy with the lowest maximum regret. Now we will discuss how to
predict the strategy that will be selected by each type of attacker according to our principle,
before describing how to select the defender’s optimal strategy according to this prediction.
Firstly, we formally define the concept of maximum regret as follows:
Definition 2. The maximum regret for an attacker with type t over a strategy ∆2, denoted595
rt(∆2), is defined as:
rt(∆2) = max
a1
(
max
∆′2
ut2(a1,∆
′
2)− ut2(a1,∆2)
)
. (10)
In Definition 2, by formula (1), given the linearity of utility functions and the fact that
there does not exist any dominant strategy for the defender, we can directly find that for
any mixed strategy of the attacker, there always exists a pure strategy a1 of the defender
such that(
max
∆′2
ut2(a1,∆
′
2)− ut2(a1,∆2)
)
≥
(
max
∆′2
ut2(∆1,∆
′
2)− ut2(∆1,∆2)
)
.
This is the reason why we only consider the pure strategies of the defender in Definition
2. Hence, this definition allows us to predict the optimal strategy for each type of attacker
as follows:600
Definition 3. Let σt2 ∈ [0, 1] be the loss tolerance degree for attacker type t and Ω2 be a
set of mixed strategies of the attacker. Then the optimal mixed strategy for t, denoted ∆t,∗2 ,
is defined as:
∆t,∗2 = argmin
∆2∈Ω2
rt(∆2), (11)
such that for any mixed strategy ∆2 ∈ Ω2, we have605
min
a1
ut2(a1,∆2) ≥
(
max
∆′2
min
a′1
ut2(a
′
1,∆
′
2)
)
− ς t2, (12)
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ς t2 = σ
t
2
(
max
∆′2
min
a′1
ut2(a
′
1,∆
′
2)−min
∆′′2
min
a′′1
ut2(a
′′
1,∆
′′
2)
)
. (13)
Formula (10) means that an attacker will select, as their optimal strategy, a mixed
strategy which can minimize their maximum regret. However, formula (12) imposes a610
constraint on the possible mixed strategies, which can be selected depending on whether
or not the strategy has an acceptable cost. That is, the minimum expected utility of the
strategy should be higher than the acceptable minimal payoff. formula (13) shows how to
calculate the maximum acceptable reduction, where ς t2 denotes the maximum loss that at-
tacker type t can tolerate given their loss tolerance degree σt2. Clearly, some attacker types615
may accept a choice with a lower minimum expected utility to reduce their maximum re-
gret, while some may reject a higher loss of their minimum expected utility. For example,
a terrorist usually shows higher tolerance for loss of their minimum expected utility than
an armed robber, who is commonly more risk-averse. In real-world applications, the value
for σt2 can be obtained for each type of attacker from, for example, historical data, crim-620
inology experts, and so on. Finally, by formulas (12) and (13), the acceptable minimal
payoff of the attacker with a given attacker type can be presented as follows:
max
∆′2
min
a′1
ut2(a
′
1,∆
′
2)− σt2
(
max
∆′2
min
a′1
ut2(a
′
1,∆
′
2)−min
∆′′2
min
a′′1
ut2(a
′′
1,∆
′′
2)
)
= σt2 min
∆′′2
min
a′′1
ut2(a
′′
1,∆
′′
2) + (1− σt2) max
∆′2
min
a′1
ut2(a
′
1,∆
′
2).
Now we can discuss how to find an optimal strategy for the defender based on the625
predicted mixed strategy ∆t,∗2 for each type of attacker and the probability distribution
over the set of attacker types. Following the principle of acceptable costs of minimax
regret, we can define the defender’s optimal strategy as follows:
Definition 4. Let σ1 ∈ [0, 1] be the loss tolerance degree for the defender and ∆t,∗2 be
the optimal mixed strategy for attacker type t. Then the optimal strategy for the defender,630
denoted ∆∗1, is defined as:
∆∗1 = argmax
∆1
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆1,∆
t,∗
2 ), (14)
such that for any pure strategy a1 that has a positive probability value in ∆1, we have
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a1, a2) ≥
(
max
a′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′
1, a2)
)
− ς1, (15)
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ς1 = σ1
(
max
a′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′
1, a2)−min
a′′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′′
1, a2)
)
. (16)635
The reason why we adopt the maximum expected utility in formula (14) is that the
defender already knows the attacker’s optimal mixed strategy ∆t,∗2 and the probability
distribution over the attacker’s possible types. So, according to Assumption A2 and by
Definition 3, the minimax regret strategy is the same as the maximum expected utility
strategy for the defender. Moreover, since the attacker’s strategy is based on a judgement640
of the attacker’s utility matrix, the loss tolerance assumption for each type of attacker, and
imperfect information obtained by surveillance system, there is a chance that the attacker
may play a different strategy than the strategy predicted by the defender. Thus, by the
linearity of the utility function, we only need to consider the pure strategies that may be
selected by the attacker in formulas (15) and 16. Hence, with regards to the σ1 value, a645
security manager can fine-tune this value to reflect different real-time applications. In this
way, our method is more flexible in balancing the possibility of unacceptable losses caused
by the failure of prevention and the expected utility for successfully preventing an attack.
Finally, by formulas (15) and (16), the acceptable minimal payoff of the attacker with a
given attacker type can be presented as follows:650
max
a′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′
1, a2)−σ1
(
max
a′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′
1, a2)−min
a′′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′′
1, a2)
)
= (1− σ1) max
a′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′
1, a2) + σ1 min
a′′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′′
1, a2).
6.1. Properties
Since the correctness of the defender’s optimal strategy in our method is based on a655
prediction of the attacker’s strategy, we consider the properties of Definition 3 to justify
the our prediction of the attacker’s strategy. Moreover, we will show that the defend-
er’s strategy in our solution concept can be considered as an extension to the maximum
expected utility strategy and that considering the defender’s set of pure strategies is suffi-
cient to find the solution. Given these properties, the whole process in our solution concept660
(i.e., acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium) can be interpreted as an optimization
problem for which there exists efficient methods of computation.
Theorem 1. Let A1 = {a11, . . . , an1} be the set of pure strategies for the defender, A2 =
{a12, . . . , an2} be the set of pure strategies for the attacker and ∆2 be a mixed strategy for
the attacker such that ∆2(ai2) = qi for each i ∈ 1, . . . , n. Then the attacker’s maximin665
strategy in an SDSRA security game is a unique equalizer. Here, for a two player game,
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an equalizer is a mixed strategy ∆i of a player i ∈ N such that there exists a constant
c ∈ R where for any pure strategy aj ∈ Aj of another player j (j 6= i), we have that
ui(∆i, aj) = c.
Proof. By the condition of an equalizer, our game has a unique equalizer if and only if for
linear equation Aq = u, where
A =

u2(a
1
1, a
1
2) · · · u2(a11, an2 )
... . . .
...
u2(a
n
1 , a
1
2) · · · u2(an1 , an2 )
1 · · · 1
 , q =
 q1...
qn
 , u =

c
...
c
1
 ,
there exists a unique solution q. Thus, rank(A) = n.4 In other words, it requires: (i) that no670
convex combination of some rows in A dominate convex combinations of other rows; and
(ii) that the utility matrix satisfies |A1| = |A2| = n. As mentioned after Definition 1, item
(i) holds because there does not exist any dominated strategy for the attacker in an SDSRA
security game. Similarly, item (ii) we holds by the definition of an SDSRA security game.
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This theorem reveals that an attacker can always find a unique strategy that guarantees
their expected utility regardless of any mixed strategy of the defender.
Theorem 2. In an SDSRA security game, for each type of attacker, the expected utility of
the maximin strategy will not be less than a completely mixed BNE in the game.
Proof. Suppose the game is a simultaneous 2-player game, in which each player has a680
finite set of strategies, (∆∗1,∆
∗
2) is a completely mixed equilibrium with excepted utilities
u∗1 and u
∗
2 for players 1 and 2 respectively, and (∆1,∆2) is the maximin strategy with
minimum expected utilities u1 and u2 respectively. By Theorem 1, we can obtain ∆2 is an
equalizer directly. Moreover, by the proof in (Pruzhansky, 2011) and the fact that ∆2 is an
equalizer, we have that u2 = u∗2.685
Since our games satisfy that no pure or mixed strategy of an attacker is strictly or
weakly dominated by a convex combination of their other strategies, Theorem 2 shows that
the attacker can always guarantee that their expected utility is no less than the completely
mixed BNE by selecting a maximin strategy. Thus, these theorems demonstrate that it is
reasonable for each type of attacker to quantify losses in relation to their maximin strategy.690
4In linear algebra, rank(A) denotes the rank of a matrix A, i.e., the dimension of the column space of A.
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Theorem 3. The maximum regret rt(∆2) for the attacker of type t for the strategy ∆2 in
an SDSRA security game can be obtained as follows:
rt(∆2) = max
a1
(
max
a2
ut2(a1, a2)− ut2(a1,∆2)
)
.
Proof. Given the linearity of utility functions and the fact that there does not exist any
dominated strategy for the attacker, we have this result straightforward.
This theorem means that we only need to consider the attacker’s pure strategies when
determining their maximum expected utility strategy with respect to the defender’s strat-
egy. In other words, this theorem confirms that our method improves the efficiency of695
predicting the strategy of each type of attacker.
Theorem 4. Suppose the utility value for successfully attacking any target is the same for
an attacker of type t, i.e., for any pure strategy profile (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2 that satisfies
a1 6= a2 (a1 is a pure strategy selected by the defender and a2 is a pure strategy selected by
the attacker), there exist a constant c ∈ <+, such that ut2(a1, a2) = c.5 Then the minimax700
regret strategy is the same as the maximin strategy for the attacker.
Proof. Suppose the mixed strategy ∆t,↑2 is the maximin strategy for attacker type t. By
Theorem 1, for any defender’s pure strategy a1, there exists a constant k such that ut2(a1,
∆t,↑2 ) = k. Then, by Theorem 3, Definition 2, u
t
2(a1, a2) = c if a1 6= a2, and the fact
that attacker only wins in the case where the defender selects a different target from the705
attacker, we have:
rt(∆t,↑2 ) = c− k. (17)
Suppose there exists a minimax regret strategy ∆t,∗2 6= ∆t,↑2 , then by Definition 2, we
have rt(∆t,∗2 ) ≤ rt(∆t,↑2 ).
First, we consider the case that rt(∆t,∗2 ) = r
t(∆t,↑2 ). By Theorem 1, Definition 2, and710
the fact that ut2(a1, a2) = c for any a1 6= a2, we have ∆t,∗2 = ∆t,↑2 . This violates our
assumption that ∆t,∗2 6= ∆t,↑2 . Thus, we have rt(∆t,∗2 ) 6= rt(∆t,↑2 ).
Second, we consider the case that rt(∆t,∗2 ) < r
t(∆t,↑2 ). Since ∆
t,↑
2 is a maximin strate-
gy, there always exists a defender’s pure strategy a′1, such that u
t
2(a
′
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) < u
t
2(a
′
1,∆
t,↑
2 ).
Then, by Theorem 1, Definition 2 and formula (17), we have
rt(∆t,↑2 ) = c− k = c− ut2(a′1,∆t,↑2 ).
Thus, for the defender’s pure strategy a′1, we have c − ut2(a′1,∆t,∗2 ) > rt(∆t,↑2 ). This
violates our assumption that rt(∆t,∗2 ) < r
t(∆t,↑2 ).
Therefore, according to the conclusions of these two cases, we have ∆t,∗2 = ∆
t,↑
2 .715
5Here a1 6= a2 means that the defender and the attacker select different targets and thus the attacker wins.
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Theorem 4 demonstrates that if the expected utility for successfully attacking each
target is the same as that for a given attacker type, then they can choose their maximin
strategy to guarantee their minimum expected utility as well as to reduce their maximum
regret. This result is useful when considering the behavior of attacker types that only care
about the successful attacker. For example, a pickpocket may view all targets as equally720
desirable, in which case, they are likely to base their decision on which target provides
the greatest chance of escape. Thus, the pickpocket ia completely lose-averse when the
potential gain is the same for all targets. The relationship between Definition 3 and both
the minimax regret strategy (Savage, 1951) (i.e., formulas (8) and (9) and maximin strate-
gy (Osborne, 2003) (i.e., formulas 6 and 7), is as follows:725
Theorem 5. Let σt2 ∈ [0, 1] be the loss tolerance degree for an attacker of type t and
∆t,∗2 be the optimal mixed strategy for t according to the principle of acceptable costs of
minimax regret:
(i) If σt2 = 1, then ∆
t,∗
2 is an optimal choice according to the maximum regret strategy.
(ii) If σt2 = 0, then ∆
t,∗
2 is an optimal choice according to the maximin strategy.730
Proof. (i) By formulas (12) and (13) and the fact that σt2 = 1, then a mixed strategy ∆2
can be any mixed strategy for the attacker. Then, by formula (10) ∆t,∗2 is also an optimal
choice according to the minimax regret strategy. (ii) By formulas (10), (12), and (13) and
the fact that σt2 = 0, then ∆
t,∗
2 can only be a mixed strategy with the maximin expected
utility. Thus, ∆t,∗2 is also an optimal choice by the maximin strategy.735
Now we can consider a property of the defender’s optimal strategy. Actually, Defini-
tion 4 can be seen as an extension to maximum expected utility theory by the following
theorem:
Theorem 6. If σ1 = 1, then the defender’s optimal pure strategy a∗1 is the maximum
expected utility strategy.740
Proof. Suppose a∗1 is the defender’s optimal strategy according to Definition 4. By formu-
las (15) and (16), and the fact that σ1 = 1, we have ∀a1 ∈ A1, ∀a2 ∈ A2:∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a1, a2) ≥ min
a′1
min
a2
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′
1, a2).
As a result, we only need to find the pure strategy a1 that satisfies formula (14). In other
words, a∗1 is the strategy in the defender’s set of pure strategies with maximum expected
utility. Moreover, by the linearity of the utility function, if a mixed strategy has maximum
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expected utility for the defender, then so do all pure strategies in support of that mixed
strategy. Thus, a∗1 is the strategy with maximum expected utility, given the probability745
distribution over attacker types as well as the predicted strategy for each type of attacker.
Theorem 6 means that a maximally risk-seeking defender just needs to consider how
to maximize their expected utility. Thus, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the static
Bayesian game is a special case of our acceptable costs of minimax regret, where all750
players are assumed to be maximally risk-seeking.
By Theorem 6, we have the following theorem to show that our solution concept can
give a less conservative strategy than the maximin strategy for the defender in case that the
attacker’s strategy has been correctly predicted:
Theorem 7. If the loss tolerance degree for a defender is σ1 = 1 and the optimal mixed
strategy for the attacker of type t is ∆t,∗2 , then the expected utility of the defender’s optimal
pure strategy a∗1 in our acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium is less conservative
than the defender’s maximin strategy ∆1. That is, in any situation, we have∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) ≥
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆1,∆
t,∗
2 ).
And there exists some cases that we have∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) >
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆1,∆
t,∗
2 ).
Proof. In an SDSRA security game, let ∆1 be the defender’s maximin strategy and a∗1 be
the defender’s optimal pure strategy. Then by Definition 1 and the fact that in SDSRA
security games, we only assign utility values based on whether or not an asset is covered.
Thus, for any pure strategy a1 of the defender, there always exists a mixed strategy ∆1 that
assigns a positive value over each pure strategy a1 ∈ A1 such that
min
∆2
u1(∆1,∆2) > min
∆2
u1(a1,∆2).
Thus, by the concept of maximin strategy revealed by formula 6 and the fact that a∗1 is a
pure strategy, we have ∆1 6= a∗1. As a result, by Theorem 6, we have∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) ≥
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆1,∆
t,∗
2 ).
Finally, by Definition 1 and formula (1), for any SDSRA game with the optimal mixed
strategy for the attacker of type t is ∆t,∗2 , we can always find a set of utility functions {ut1}
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for defender, such that there exists a pure strategy a∗1, which satisfies that for any a
′
1 6= a∗1,
we have ∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) >
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
′
1,∆
t,∗
2 ).
As a result, for any mixed strategy ∆1 6= a∗1, we have∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) >
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆1,∆
t,∗
2 ).
By the fact that ∆1 6= a∗1, we have∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(a
∗
1,∆
t,∗
2 ) ≥
∑
t∈T
p(t)ut1(∆1,∆
t,∗
2 ).
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Finally, we have the following theorem which improves the efficiency for counting the
defender’s optimal strategy with our solution concept by allowing us to only consider the
defender’s set of pure strategies:
Theorem 8. The optimal strategy for the defender ∆∗1 in an SDSRA security game is a
pure strategy in the defender’s set of pure strategies A1.760
Proof. Suppose A1 = {a11, . . . , an1} is the defender’s set of pure strategies and A′1 ⊂ A1
is a set of pure strategies which, for any ai1 ∈ A′1, satisfies formulas (15) and (16). Then,
the mixed strategy which satisfies formulas 15 and 16 is a probability distribution q over
A1 = {a11, . . . , an1}, such that for any ai1 ∈ A′1, we have q(ai1) ≥ 0 and for any aj1 ∈ A1\A′1,
we have q(aj1) = 0. Moreover, by formulas (15) and (16), q(a
i
1) ∈ [0, 1] for any ai1 ∈ A′1.765
Finally, given the linearity of the value of the expected utility functions, by formula (14),
we obtain this result directly.
Theorem 8 says that we only need to consider the defender’s set of pure strategies in
order to determine their optimal strategy by Definition 4.
6.2. Linear Programming770
Given Definitions 3 and 4 as well as Theorems 1, 3 and 8, the whole process of finding
a defender’s optimal pure strategy can be solved by Linear Programming (i.e., LP 1) and
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (i.e. MILP 2). In particular, LP 1 describes how to
predict the mixed strategy ∆t2 that will be selected by each type of attacker, while MILP 2
describes how to select the optimal pure strategy a1 such that ∆1(a1) = 1 for the defender775
based on this prediction. In each program, free indices denote universal quantification over
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min Rt
s.t. Rt ≥ max
a′2∈A2
(
ut2(a1, a
′
2)
)− ∑
a2∈A2
∆t2(a2)u
t
2(a1, a2) (for any a1 ∈ A1)∑
a2∈A2
∆t2(a2)u
t
2(a1, a2) ≥ (1− σt2)Bt2 + σt2V t2 (for any a1 ∈ A1)
Bt2 =
∑
a2∈A2
t2(a2)u
t
2(a1, a2) (for any a1 ∈ A1)
V t2 = min
a1∈A1
min
a2∈A2
ut2(a1, a2)∑
a2∈A2
t2(a2) = 1
t2(a2) ∈ [0, 1]∑
a2∈A2
∆t2(a2) = 1
∆t2(a2) ∈ [0, 1]
LP 1: Finding attacker type t’s optimal mixed strategy ∆t2 where 
t
2(a2) is a mixed
strategy representing the equalizer for t.
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max
∑
t∈T
∑
a1∈A1
∑
a2∈A2
p(t)∆1(a1)∆
t
2(a2)u
t
1(a1, a2)
s.t.
∑
t∈T
∑
a1∈A1
p(t)∆1(a1)u
t
1(a1, a2) ≥ (1− σ1)B1 + σ1V1 (for any a2 ∈ A2)
0 ≤ B1−
∑
t∈T
p(t) min
a2
ut1(a1, a2)≤M(1−∆′1(a1)) (for any ∆′1(a1) over A1)
V1 ≤
∑
t∈T
p(t) min
a2
ut1(a1, a2) (for any a1 ∈ A1)∑
a1∈A1
∆1(a1) = 1
∆1(a1) ∈ {0, 1}∑
a1∈A1
∆′1(a1) = 1
∆′1(a1) ∈ {0, 1}
MILP 2: Finding the defender’s optimal pure strategy a1 such that ∆1(a1) = 1 where
∆t2 is the predicted optimal mixed strategy for attacker type t and M is some large
constant.
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constraints with the exception of attacker type t ∈ T in LP 1, (e.g., the first constraint in
LP 1 is repeated for each pure strategy a1 ∈ A1). We will now briefly summarize these
programs.
In LP 1, the objective function and the first constraint represent formula (10) while the780
second, third and fourth constraints represent formulas (12) and (13), where t2 is a mixed
strategy representing the equalizer for an attacker of type t, Bt2 is the maximin expected
utility for the attacker with type t, and V t2 is the minimum expected utility for the attacker
with type t. The inputs to LP 1 are the utility of each pure strategy profile ut2(a1, a2)
for each type of attacker, the loss tolerance degree σt2 for each type of attacker, and the785
maximin strategy t2(a2). These inputs comprise the definition of an SDSRA problem as
in Definition 1, and the loss-aversion attitude of each type of attacker. The output from
LP 1 is then a mixed strategy ∆t2.
In MILP 2, the objective function represents formula (14), while the first, second and
third constraints represent formulas (15) and 16, where B1 is the maximin expected utility790
for the defender and V1 is the minimum expected utility for the defender. Moreover, the
fourth constraint limits the strategy selected by the defender to a pure distribution over A1,
(i.e., either ∆1(a1) = 1 or ∆1(a1) = 0). The inputs for MILP 2 are the optimal mixed
strategy ∆t2 for each type of attacker obtained by LP 1, the probability distribution p(t)
over attacker types, the defender’s utility for each pure strategy profile ut1(a1, a2), and the795
defender’s loss tolerance degree σ1. These inputs comprise the definition of an SDSRA
problem as in Definition 1, and the loss-aversion attitude of the defender. The output from
MILP 2 is then a pure strategy ∆1.
7. Evaluation
In this section we will illustrate our linear programming model firstly, and then we will800
prove the robustness of our results and present some experimental results to demonstrate
their real-world viability.
7.1. Scenario
Now, suppose in the security game for SDSRA in Examples 1 and 2, the defender has
a loss tolerance degree of 0.5 while attacker types t1, t2 and t3 have loss tolerance degrees805
of 0.8, 0.5 and 0.2, respectively. The game is then solved using LP 1 and MILP 2 in order
to determine the defender’s optimal pure strategy. Assume a threat has been detected such
that p(t1) = 0.2, p(t2) = 0.3 and p(t3) = 0.5.
Now we consider LP 1. The meaning of the objective function is that we want to
minimize the value of some variable Rt ∈ R for attacker type t. The first constraint810
imposes a restriction on the possible value of Rt with respect to t’s utility values ut2 and
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some other variable ∆t2, where the seventh and eighth constraints impose a restriction that
∆t2 be a probability distribution over the attacker’s set of pure strategies A2, (i.e., that ∆
t
2
be a mixed strategy). This first constraint is repeated for each a1 ∈ A1. That is, if the
defender plays strategy a1 ∈ A1, then an instance of this constraint says that the value815
of Rt must be no less than the difference between t’s maximum utility for a1, given any
pure strategy a2 ∈ A2, and t’s expected utility for a1, given the mixed strategy ∆t2. For
example, consider attacker type t1 from Table 2a such that t = t1. Suppose a1 = SM and
∆t2(SM) = ∆
t
2(FCE) = ∆
t
2(H) =
1
3
, then
max
a2∈A2
ut2(a1, a2) = max{−7, 3, 5} = 5,820 ∑
a2∈A2
∆t2(a2)u
t
2(a1, a2) =
1
3
· (−7) + 1
3
· 3 + 1
3
· 5 = 1
3
.
Thus, their difference is 5− 1
3
= 14
3
. Similarly, the difference between the maximum utility
and ∆t2(SM) = ∆
t
2(FCE) = ∆
t
2(H) =
1
3
for a1 = FCE is 5 and for a1 = H is 7. In
other words, for these values of ∆t2, we have constraints such that R
t ≥ 14
3
, Rt ≥ 5, and
Rt ≥ 7 meaning that Rt must be at least 7. Obviously, if we change the values of ∆t2, then825
the lower boundary of Rt will change. Thus, the aim of LP 1 is to find the values of ∆t2
which support the lowest boundary of Rt , given the utility values ut2.
The second constraint in LP 1 imposes a restriction on the possible values of ∆t2 such
that the expected utility for ∆t2 (i.e.,
∑
a2∈A2 ∆
t
2(a2)u
t
2(a1, a2)) must be not lower than
some acceptable minimal payoff values (1− σl2)Bl2 + σl2V l2 . Again, the second constraint
is repeated for each a1 ∈ A1. The acceptable minimal payoff itself is defined by the third
and fourth constraints. In fact, this acceptable minimal payoff acts as a constant for t based
on their loss tolerance degree σt2 where B
t
2 is the maximin expected utility for t and V
t
2
is the minimum utility for t. More specifically, for the maximin expected utility Bt2, we
need to find a mixed strategy ∆t2 such that their expected utilities are the same, regardless
of the strategy selected by the defender. For example, consider again attacker type t1 from
Table 2a such that t = t1. To determine the value of Bl2, we first need to find values for
t2(SM), 
t
2(FCE), and 
t
2(H) such that 
t
2(SM) + 
t
2(FCE) + 
t
2(H) = 1 and
t2(SM) · (−7) + t2(FCE) · (3) + t2(H) · (5)
= t2(SM) · (9) + t2(FCE) · (−2) + t2(H) · (5)
= t2(SM) · (9) + t2(FCE) · (3) + t2(H) · (−6).
This is called the equalizer and we have t2(SM) =
55
311
, t2(FCE) =
176
311
and t2(H) =
80
311
.
Thus, Bl2 =
543
311
. For V l2 , the value can be obtained directly from the utility matrix. In
this case, V l2 = min{−7,−6,−2, 3, 5, 9}=−7. Given that σt12 = 0.8, then the acceptable
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minimal payoff for t1 is 0.2 · 543311 +0.8·(−7)=−0.21. Finally, if we model the constraints
for t1 in full, then we arrive at the following LP problem:
min Rt
s.t. Rt ≥ 5− (∆t2(SM) · (−7) + ∆t2(FCE) · (3) + ∆t2(H) · (5))
Rt ≥ 9− (∆t2(SM) · (9) + ∆t2(FCE) · (−2) + ∆t2(H) · (5))
Rt ≥ 9− (∆t2(SM) · (9) + ∆t2(FCE) · (3) + ∆t2(H) · (−6))
∆t2(SM) · (−7) + ∆t2(FCE) · (3) + ∆t2(H) · (5) ≥ −0.21
∆t2(SM) · (9) + ∆t2(FCE) · (−2) + ∆t2(H) · (5) ≥ −0.21
∆t2(SM) · (9) + ∆t2(FCE) · (3) + ∆t2(H) · (−6) ≥ −0.21∑
a2∈A2
∆t2(a2) = 1
∆t2(a2) ∈ [0, 1]
By solving the above problem with an LP solver, we will find that ∆t2(SM) = 0.361,
∆t2(FCE) = 0.439, and ∆
t
2(H) = 0.2. Thus, by the principle of acceptable costs of mini-
max regret, we predict that t1 will play this mixed strategy. Similarly, if we apply this pro-830
cess for t2 and t3, we will obtain the mixed strategies {∆t22 (SM) = 0.325,∆t22 (FCE) =
0.35,∆t22 (H) = 0.325} and {∆t32 (SM) = 0.349,∆t32 (FCE) = 0.326,∆t32 (H) = 0.326},
respectively.
Now consider MILP 2. The meaning of the objective function is that we want to find a
pure strategy which can maximize the defender’s expected utility according to the mixed
strategy prediction for each attacker type. However, the first constraint again imposes a re-
striction that the chosen strategy satisfies an acceptable minimal payoff obtained by using
the defender’s loss tolerance degree which, in this case, is σ1 = 0.5. By referring to the
defender’s utility values, the probability distribution over attacker types and the predicted
mixed strategy for each attacker type, we arrive at the following objective function:
max Et1 + Et2 + Et3
s.t. Et1 = 0.2 · (Et1SM + Et1FCE + Et1H )
Et2 = 0.3 · (Et2SM + Et3FCE + Et3H )
Et3 = 0.5 · (Et3SM + Et3FCE + Et3H )
Et1SM = ∆1(SM) · (0.361 · 7 + 0.439 · (−3) + 0.2 · (−6))
Et1FCE = ∆1(FCE) · (0.361 · (−8) + 0.439 · 4 + 0.2 · (−6))
Et1H = ∆1(H) · (0.361 · (−8) + 0.439 · (−3) + 0.2 · 6)
Et2SM = ∆1(SM) · (0.325 · 5 + 0.35 · (−6) + 0.325 · (−5))
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Et2FCE = ∆1(FCE) · (0.325 · (−4) + 0.35 · 7 + 0.325 · (−5))
Et2H = ∆1(H) · (0.325 · (−4) + 0.35 · (−6) + 0.325 · 6)
Et3SM = ∆1(SM) · (0.349 · 5 + 0.326 · (−4) + 0.326 · (−6))
Et3SM = ∆1(FCE) · (0.349 · (−5) + 0.326 · 5 + 0.326 · (−6))
Et3SM = ∆1(H) · (0.349 · (−5) + 0.326 · (−4) + 0.326 · 7)
The second constraint then imposes comparable restrictions on the possible pure strate-
gy which can be selected to those described for LP 1. Once we have imposed the con-835
straints and solved the problem with an LP solver, we will find that ∆1(SM) = 1 and
∆1(FCE) = ∆1(H) = 0. Thus, according to the principle of acceptable costs of mini-
max regret, the defender’s optimal pure strategy for this game is SM .
7.2. Analyzing Robustness
In a linear program, it is often the case that some (or all) of the right-hand sides of the840
constraints are subject to sources of uncertainty, including errors of measurement, absence
of information, and so on. This uncertainty will therefore reduce our confidence in the
solution of the linear programming. Good modeling practice requires an evaluation of
how optimum solutions change if we modify the constraints and the robustness of the
linear programming in the presence of uncertainty. In this subsection, we will carry out845
such an evaluation with respect to our solution to SDSRA problems.
In SDSRA problems, the loss tolerance degree for each player is an absolute value
and is based on expert’s subjective judgements and historical data. Therefore, SDSRA
problems are clearly subject to uncertainty. It is useful to consider how small changes to
a loss tolerance degree might change the strategy selected by the attacker, as well as the850
robustness of the defender’s expected utility for their optimal strategy. Firstly, we want
to show that a small change to the loss tolerance degree of the attacker does not cause
a dramatic change to the strategy selected by the attacker. In other words, we want to
show that the solution by Definition 3 is continuous when the loss tolerance degree of the
attacker is in the range [0, 1]. In order to prove this, we need to consider the existence of855
the optimal solution for each type of attacker based on Definition 3. By Theorem 1, we
have the following:
Lemma 1. In an SDSRA security game, each type of attacker can always select a strategy
∆2 as a feasible strategy which satisfies:
min
a1
ut2(a1,∆2) ≥
(
max
∆2
min
a1
ut2(a1,∆2)
)
− ς2,860
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ς2 = σ
t
2
(
max
∆2
min
a1
ut2(a1,∆2)−min
∆′2
min
a′1
ut2(a
′
1,∆
′
2)
)
,
where ∆′2 and ∆
′′
2 are mixed strategies for the attacker and σ
t
2 ∈ [0, 1] is a loss tolerance
degree.
Moreover, the existence of the optimal solution for each attacker type can be proved
by the following:865
Theorem 9. In an SDSRA security game, each type of attacker can always find an optimal
strategy that satisfies Definition 3 by LP 1.
Proof. Suppose σt2 ∈ [0, 1] is a degree of loss tolerance for an attacker of type t, v(γ(∆ta))
is the maximum regret value of the minimax regret strategy γ(∆ta) of attacker of type t, and
v(∆ta) is the maximum regret value of the maximin strategy ∆
t
a of attacker of type t. Then,870
by Lemma 1, ∆ta is a feasible solution to LP 1. Thus, when σ
t
2 ∈ [0, 1], the feasible solution
set of LP 1 exists. Finally, if the feasible solution set of LP 1 exists, that the probability
value of each pure strategy of a given type of attacker is in the interval [0, 1], and the
optimal objective value of LP 1 is in the interval [v(∆ta), v(γ(∆
t
a))], then given the linearity
of expected utility functions with the probability distribution over the attacker types, we875
can find that the optimal solution of each type of attacker exists straightforward.
In order to make the proof of the next theorem easier to understand, we introduce a
translation of a normal linear programming problem into an augmented form (slack form)
parametric linear programming problem. Here an augmented form means to replace in-
equalities with equalities in the constraints by introducing non-negative slack variables. 6880
An example of the augmented form translation is given as follows:
max z = −x1 + x2 min − z = x1 − (x3 − x4)
s.t. 2x1 − x2 ≥ −2 s.t. 2x1 − (x3 − x4)− x5 = −2
x1 − 2x2 ≤ 2 ⇒ x1 − 2(x3 − x4) + x6 = 2
x1 + x2 ≤ 5 x1 + (x3 − x4) + x7 = 5
x1 ≥ 0 xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 7
Based on such translation, we have the following theorem, which means the solution
for LP 1 is continuous:
6We refer the reader to (Schrijver, 1998) for more details about this translation.
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Theorem 10. Let σt2 ∈ [0, 1] be the loss tolerance degree for the attacker of type t and
∆t,∗2 be the optimal mixed strategy for t. Then ∆
t,∗
2 is a continuous vector function or a885
continuous point-to-set mapping.
Proof. First, we will translate our linear programming problem in LP 1 into an augmented
form (slack form) parametric linear programming problem based on the loss tolerance
degree σt2. Then by LP 1, suppose ∆
t
2 = {x1, . . . , xn} is a mixed strategy for attacker type
t,
kj = max
a2∈A2
ut2(a
j
1, a2)
for each pure strategy aj1 of the defender such that j = 1, . . . , n, x3n+1 − x3n+2 is the
maximum regret value Rt found in LP 1, xn+1, . . . , x3n are surplus variables required to
translate the inequalities into equalities, and Bt2 and V
t
2 are the same constants as those in
LP 1. Then we can obtain a parametric linear programming based on the loss tolerance
degree σt2 which takes the augmented form as follows:
min x3n+1 − x3n+2
s.t. x3n+1 − x3n+2 +
n∑
xi=1
xiu
t
2(a1, a
′
2)− xn+j = kj + σt2 × 0
n∑
xi=1
xi = 1 + σ
t
2 × 0
n∑
xi=1
xiu
t
2(a1, a
′
2)− x2n+l = Bt2 + σt2(V t2 −Bt2)
xm ≥ 0
where l = 1, . . . , n and m = 1, . . . , 3n+ 1, 3n+ 2.
Then, we can find that such augmented form satisfies the following form:
min cx
s.t. Ax = b1σt2 + b2 = b(σ
t
2)
x ≥ 0
σt2 ∈ R
b1, b2 ∈ Rm
c, x ∈ Rn
where A is an m× n matrix with such that rank(A) = m. Moreover, by Theorem 9, LP 1
can always find the optimal solution when σt2 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, depending on degeneracy
35
of the parametric linear programming based on the loss tolerance degree (i.e., LP 1), the890
solution to LP 1 is a continuous vector function or a continuous point-to-set mapping based
on σt2 according to the proof in (Zhang and Liu, 1990).
Actually, Theorem 10 demonstrates the robustness of our solution concept when se-
lecting the attacker’s strategy, in the sense that a small change of their loss tolerance degree
does not make a big difference on the result.895
We can now consider the robustness of our solution concept when selecting the de-
fender’s optimal strategy. There are three aspects: (i) robustness with respect to the worst
case; (ii) robustness with respect to uncertainty over the loss tolerance degree for each type
of attacker; and (iii) robustness with respect to a deviation from the loss tolerance degree
for each type of attacker. Let us first consider aspect (i). By Definition 4 in our solution900
concept, we have that formulas (15) and (16) guarantee that the minimum expected utility
for a given pure strategy is acceptable for the defender. That is, even if the defender plays
against an arbitrary attacker, they can always select a maximin strategy to guarantee their
minimum expected utility when the attacker is playing the worst-case strategy. Therefore,
our solution concept is robust regarding aspect (i). Let us now consider aspects (ii) and905
(iii). Since the minimum expected utility of the minimax regret strategy for the attacker is
always higher than the minimin expected utility of the attacker, we can determine a range
by sensitivity analysis of the linear program (Schrijver, 1998) over which the loss toler-
ance degree for a given type attacker will not change the optimal mixed strategy. Formally,
we have910
Corollary 1. Let γ(∆ta) be the minimax regret strategy for an attacker of type t, σ
t
2 be
the loss tolerance degree for t, uta be the maximin expected utility for t, u
t
a be the minimin
expected utility for t, and ∆t,∗2 be the optimal mixed strategy for t. Then ∆
t,∗
2 remains the
same if x ≤ σt2 ≤ 1, where
x =
uta −min
a1
ut2(a1, γ(∆
t
a))
uta − uta
.915
If the defender’s estimation of the loss tolerance degree of a given type of attacker
is in the interval outlined in Corollary 1 (i.e., σt2 ∈ [x, 1]) then the defender’s optimal
strategy does not need to change. Therefore, Corollary 1 reveals the degree of uncertainty
or deviation over the attacker’s loss tolerance degree that the defender can tolerate. In
other words, Corollary 1 reflects both aspects (ii) and (iii) in our robustness analysis.920
7.3. Methods Comparison
In this subsection, we will give a summary of the comparison of our method with
different methods in the security game for SDSRA.
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Generally speaking, although there are various methods for different applications in
the security game, we can still distinguish them according to the operation mechanism-925
s behind them as follows: (i) Stackelberg Game Framework (SGF): the attacker has at
least partial knowledge of the defender’s strategy commitment and the attacker will act
after they learn the selection of the defender, such as the methods in (Tambe, 2011; Yang
et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2015; Sinha et al., 2016),
etc.. (ii) Nash Equilibrium Framework (NEF): attacker and defender both have complete930
knowledge about the strategy selected by each other and both players act simultaneous,
such as the method in (Korzhyk et al., 2011). (iii) Machine Learning Framework (MLF):
it requires significant amounts of historical data about players interactions in order to learn
a reasonably representative model of adversary behavior. Then, the defender selects the
strategy with maximum expected utility as their optimal strategy. (iv) Quantal Response935
Framework (QRF): in this framework, attackers are assumed to make errors in choosing
which pure strategy to play. The probability of any particular strategy being chosen is pos-
itively related to the payoff from that strategy, such as the method in (Yang et al., 2012).
(v) Worst Case Framework (WCF): the attacker may act randomly and the defender just
wants to guarantee their minimum utility in the worst case, such as the methods proposed940
by Kiekintveld and Kreinovich (2012), Nguyen et al. (2014a), and Pita et al. (2010). In
this framework, the defender selects their strategy based on the maximin strategy.
In order to show the advantages of our method in the security game of SDSRA in
Definition 1, we examine the following aspects: (i) Knowledge (of the defender’s strategy
commitment): since in SDSRA problems, the assumption of complete or partial knowl-945
edge of the defender’s strategy commitment is unrealistic as argued in Section 2, it is
important to judge whether a mechanism can be used to solve the SDSRA problems or
not. (ii) Training Data: since there is very limited data available in infrastructure securi-
ty domains (which we focus on in SDSRA problems), it is impossible to obtain enough
training data to analyse the behavior of the attacker in SDSRA problem. (iii) Prediction950
Power: since the defender needs to find out their optimal strategy based on the prediction
of the attackers’ strategies in SDSRA problems, the prediction power of the attackers’ be-
havior determines the quality of the defender’s action in threat prevention. (iv) Robust:
since the attacker’s strategy is based on a judgement of the attacker’s utility matrix, the
loss tolerance assumption for each type of attacker, and imperfect information obtained by955
surveillance system, there is a chance that the attacker may play a strategy different from
the strategy predicted by the defender. Therefore, we need a mechanisms that can properly
deal with this sort of uncertainty and avoid unacceptable losses in the worst case. (iv) So-
lution Quality: if two mechanisms can both be used to solve SDSRA problems, we need
to consider which one will give the defender a higher expect utility. Now, based on such960
consideration, we can compare our method with these four types of operation mechanisms
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Knowledge Training Data Prediction Power Robust Solution Quality
SGF Complete or partial (×) Unnecessary Weak(×) Weak(×) -
NEF Complete (×) Unnecessary Weak(×) Weak(×) -
MLF Unnecessary Required (×) Weak(×) Weak(×) -
QRF Unnecessary Unnecessary Weak (×) Weak (×) -
WCF Unnecessary Unnecessary Unnecessary Strong Lower(×)
Our’s Unnecessary Unnecessary Strong Strong Higher
Table 6: Methods Comparasion
as shown in Table 6.
In Table 6, the symbol of (×) means that a given operation mechanism is unsuitable for
solving the SDSRA problems or there exists a mechanism better than the given mechanism
in an aspect. And the symbol of − means that since the mechanism is unsuitable for965
solving the SDSRA problems or there exists a mechanism better than the given mechanism
in some aspects, we do not consider its solution quality. Moreover, for the second row of
Table 6, we can find that since Stackelberg game framework requires complete or partial
knowledge of the defender’s strategy commitment, its prediction power for the SDSRA
problems is weak. Also, since the Stackelberg game framework only focuses the maximum970
expected utility of the defender, its robust is weak. From the third row of Table 6, similarly
to SGF, we can find that Nash Equilibrium framework requires complete knowledge of the
defender’s strategy commitment, its prediction power for the SDSRA problems is weak,
and its robust is weak. In the fourth row, we consider the machine learning framework.
For this framework, since it requires a large training data to analyse the behavior of the975
attackers but there is very limited data available in SDSRA problems, its prediction power
and robust is weak. In the fifth row, we analyse the quantal response framework. Although
this framework does not require the knowledge of the defender’s strategy commitment or
any training data, its assumption that the attacker’s ignorance over the defender’s strategy
should be modeled by the principle of indifference is not on the line of our intuition and980
the human behaviors in game theory revealed by psychological experiments and analysis
of economics (Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003; Savage,
1951). Actually, the behavior of the column player in the Aumann and Maschler Game
in Table 3 and that in the Asymmetric matching pennies game in Table 4 indeed show
that in some situations, it is unrealistic to assume that the row player’s ignorance about the985
column player should be modeled by a mixed strategy which assigns equal probabilities to
all pure strategies. Thus, we doubt the prediction power of the quantal response framework
can properly solve the SDSRA problem. In the sixth row, we find that although the worst
case framework does not require the knowledge of the defender’s strategy commitment or
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any training data and its performance in prediction power and robust is acceptable for the990
SDSRA problem, by Theorem 7, it is conservative than our solution concept. Thus, we do
not think such framework is suitable for solving the SDSRA problem since our model can
always get an expected payoff for the defender not less than this framework.
Finally, for the seventh row, we can easily find that our solution concept satisfies the
limitations of the SDSRA problem is the aspects of knowledge about the defender’s strat-995
egy commitment and training data by the rationalizability of our solution concept in the
SDSRA problem that revealed by Section 5. And by the rationalizability of our solution
concept in Section 5, Theorems 2 and 5, and the fact about human behaviors in game
theory revealed by psychological experiments and analysis of economics (Ellsberg, 1961;
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003; Savage, 1951), we can find that the per-1000
formance of our method in the aspect of prediction power is better than other operation
mechanisms. Hence, by Definition 4 and Section 7.2, we can obtain that the robustness of
our method is as strong as the worse case framework. Also, by Theorem 7, we indeed find
the performance of our method is better than the worse case framework in the aspect of
solution quality. And all of them are the reasons why our solution concept should be used1005
to solve the security game of SDSRA problems.
7.4. Experiments
An implementation of our solution concept, called SDSRA, was developed in Java for
the IBM ILOG CPLEX OPTIMIZATION STUDIO7 software and is available online.8 In order
to experimentally evaluate the viability of our solution concept, we have opted for random-1010
ly generated SDSRA security games as our data set. All utility values are random integers
in the range [−10, 0] or [0, 10], depending on whether a target is covered or uncovered. All
experiments were carried out on a desktop computer with an Intel Xeon E5-2620 2GHz
CPU and 16GB of RAM running Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit. The software
versions used during these experiments were SDSRA 1.0 and IBM ILOG CPLEX OPTIMIZA-1015
TION STUDIO 12.6.
By Definition 1, we know that the size of the input is based on the number of utility
values, which are determined by the set of attacker types T and the set of pure strategy
profiles Ψ. Therefore, we will focus on the value of |T × Ψ| in our experiments (i.e., for
LP 1 and MILP 2). Figure 1a shows the results for an experiment on randomly generated1020
SDSRA security games with one type of attacker, where the number of targets is incre-
mented from 2. Figure 1b then shows the results for an experiment on randomly generated
SDSRA security games with two targets, where the number of attacker types is increment-
7http://www-01.ibm.com/software/commerce/optimization/cplex-optimizer
8https://github.com/kevinmcareavey/sdsra
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Figure 1: Mean time (from 1000 samples) required to find the acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium
in randomly generated SDSRA security games using LP 1 and MILP 2), where |T ×Ψ| is the total number
of utility values for each player.
ed from 1. In each case, we can see that the total time required to determine the defender’s
optimal pure strategy is linearly increasing with the total number of utilities values for1025
each player, i.e., the product of the set of attacker types T and the set of pure strategy pro-
files Ψ. Obviously, if there are n targets, then |Ψ| = n2. This is the reason why our data
points become more sparse in Figure 1a as the number of targets is increased. However,
the results for Figure 1b clearly demonstrate that the number of attacker types has a more
significant impact on run time than the number of targets. This result is unsurprising given1030
that we must solve LP 1 for each type of attacker in order to predict their optimal mixed
strategy. Nonetheless, these results convincingly evidence that our programs scale to very
large games, e.g., Figure 1a shows that a game with 1 attacker type and 100,000 pure s-
trategy profiles can be solved within 250 ms, while Figure 1b shows that a game with 4
pure strategy profiles and 300 attacker types can be solved within 200 ms. Thus, it is very1035
likely that our solution concept is viable for many real-world SDSRA environments.
8. Conclusion
It is very important to support online security resource allocation in intelligence surveil-
lance systems in real-world applications. However, existing work on game-theoretic secu-
rity resource allocation and its applications has addressed little the subject of surveillance-1040
driven security resource allocation (SDSRA). To this end, in this paper we proposed a
new solution concept, called acceptable costs of minimax regret equilibrium, for handling
game-theoretic SDSRA based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret. The
main ideas behind our work are the concepts of loss-aversion and regret. In general, human
attackers have different objectives and loss-aversion attitudes. When planning an attack,1045
these play a major role in their decision-making process and thus the strategy to which
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they commit. We believe that this critical issue has not been adequately addressed in the
literature, and thus in this paper we have explored how these issues affect the prediction of
the attacker’s strategies as well as the defender’s optimal strategy selection. Moreover, we
theoretically reveal some essential properties of this solution concept, and formulated the1050
solution concept as an efficient, solvable linear programming problem. The experimen-
tal evaluation, prove the robustness of our solution concept, show the advantages of our
model for solving SDSRA problem, and based on an extensive implementation of the new
solution concept and other related components, provides reassurance that even for very
large games, our solution concept remains viable. We believe that the findings in this pa-1055
per provide some valuable insight into how real-time surveillance information can be used
for dynamic security resource allocation. In particular, how regret and different levels of
loss-aversion may influence the prediction of an attacker’s strategy and the subsequent
selection of a strategy for the defender.
There are numerous possibilities for further work. Perhaps the most interesting one is1060
to demonstrate, in an online surveillance environment, that selecting the defender’s optimal
strategy using our solution concept is preferable to a subjective security team assessmen-
t. Thus, an important challenge is to conduct an experimental study of the psychological
aspects of our solution concept based on human trials. Another avenue for future work
relates to the SDSRA problems with dependent multiple attackers. That is, the attackers1065
in the SDSRA problem can negotiate with each other and try to cooperate or share the
profit obtained in an attack. For example, in some terrorist attacks, the attackers work as a
team to attack multiple targets and they share the total profit obtained in a series of attacks.
Clearly, in this case, the non-cooperative static (simultaneous move) game we constructed
in this paper is unsuitable Thus, it is necessary to construct a cooperative game and find1070
out a new solution concept. And in this paper, we have mentioned that the loss tolerance
degree of each type of attacker can be learned from data or can be estimated by domain
experts and the security manager can fine-tune loss tolerance degree of the defender to
reflect different real-time applications. However, we still not give the formal methods to
obtain the two values. Thus, it is worth considering some proper methods to estimate the1075
two values. Finally, since the SDSRA problems is based on the surveillance-driven proba-
bilistic information obtained by an intelligent surveillance system, it is interesting to study
how to integrate our method with an intelligence surveillance system in practice. There-
fore, we plan to extend the event reasoning framework developed in the CSIT project Ma
et al. (2010, 2009); Hong et al. (2016) with our method as a means of evaluating our work1080
in practice.
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